Afghanistan and Pakistan
The categories we casually use to describe the habitable continents on our planet can be notoriously arbitrary. This is true particularly for the Eurasian landmass, and even truer for the territory that spreads from what is usually called the “Middle East” through South Asia. Pakistan is usually grouped into South Asia because of its close connections to India both historically and geostrategically. Afghanistan has no permanent home: it is either at the far left of maps of South Asia, at the far right of maps of the Middle East, or all the way at the bottom of maps of Central Asia.
Since September 2001 Afghanistan has become far more central to Americans, and, as a consequence, policymakers have also awoken to Pakistan’s perennial importance. Afghanistan under the Taliban government was the headquarters for al-Qaeda and the place where the 9/11 terror attacks were planned. Since then, the country has become the site of what is often called the “longest war” in U.S. history. Thanks to their shared Islamic culture and the presence of Pashtun communities on both sides of the Durand Line (the still formally unrecognized border between Afghanistan and Pakistan), the two states have been inseparable, politically and militarily, since the creation of Pakistan in 1947. And the U.S. focus on the region since 9/11 has dragged India westward, so to speak, shifting the focus of U.S.-India bilateral ties toward terrorism and regional security, although India’s interest in Afghan affairs long predates September 2001.
The State and Defense Departments have not seen eye to eye on where Afghanistan and Pakistan belong, partly on account of differing policy priorities. During the Cold War, Pakistan mattered to the U.S. government as an ally counterbalancing a vaguely pro-Soviet India, then as an ally against the Soviet puppet state in Afghanistan. Afterwards, the U.S. government was mainly concerned about nuclear proliferation, a matter nowhere near the array of issues relevant to Afghanistan. After 9/11, Afghanistan came to matter more to U.S. policymakers than Pakistan, but it quickly became apparent that U.S. objectives with regard to Afghanistan were unachievable without cooperation from Pakistan. In 2009 the Obama Administration created the State Department’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, reflecting the inadequacy of the bureaucratic setup in the government to handle it.
At the same time, India’s relationship with the United States came to matter as much or more than the Afghanistan-Pakistan portfolio because of India’s status as a rising democratic great power that shared U.S. concerns over China. If we take South Asia as a whole, we find two nuclear-weapons states and a third of the planet’s population. It is also home to a dense network of jihadi groups and is an epicenter of global terrorism rivaling that found in the core of the Middle East. But it also encompasses the world’s largest electoral democracy and one of the rising economic superpowers of the century. U.S. objectives in South Asia are therefore very complex. The most important goal is to strengthen ties with India, invest in its economy, improve bilateral counterterrorism cooperation, and encourage it to become a pillar of support for global liberal order.
The second most important goal is to find a workable solution to the various intertwined problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including denying safe haven to al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups; preventing the Taliban from returning to power in Afghanistan; halting Pakistan’s support for some jihadi groups while supporting Pakistan’s fight against others; helping Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal; preventing the further proliferation of nuclear technology; preventing war with India over Kashmir; achieving a peace settlement in Afghanistan; and supporting nascent and fragile democracies in both countries. This is a difficult and ambitious agenda, especially since some of these goals work at cross-purposes with others.
Pakistan is arguably the hardest problem in U.S. foreign policy.
While the most obvious opportunities for the United States concern India, the greatest threats emanate from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan is arguably the hardest problem in U.S. foreign policy. It is not (quite) the most important—sustaining NATO, managing China’s voluble trajectory, and improving ties with India are more so—but the range of problems surrounding Pakistan is more complex. Just consider: While the biggest threats to U.S. interests in South Asia come from Pakistan, the officially designated U.S. ally in South Asia is Pakistan itself.
The United States can and does derive some strategic benefits from its on-again, off-again alliance with Pakistan, but it also incurs steep costs. The alliance is neither completely useless nor unproblematic, as its troubled history shows. If the U.S. government sees opportunities to deepen the positive aspects of its relationship with Pakistan it should certainly seize them, but the next Administration should also lay contingency plans for a strategic shift away from Pakistan altogether.
Pakistan has been an episodically useful ally against both the Soviet Union and al-Qaeda. Pakistan was a formal treaty ally of the United States from 1954 to 1979, a signatory to two treaties—the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)—both contained mutual defense guarantees. Pakistan withdrew from those treaties in 1972 and 1979, respectively, and the United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to Pakistan today, a point usually overlooked by Pakistani officials. However, Pakistan’s cooperation was crucial in defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and it has lent some assistance to U.S. counterterrorism efforts since 2001. In 2004, hoping to increase Pakistan’s value to the United States, President George W. Bush designated Pakistan a Major Non-NATO Ally; this was almost certainly a mistake.
Washington and Islamabad have had a long intelligence liaison relationship that goes back to the early days of the Cold War. Pakistan allowed the United States to use its territory for intelligence collection in the 1960s, including an air base for aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union and technical facilities to intercept communications. U.S.-Pakistani intelligence cooperation, like all aspects of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, cooled following the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war but revived in the 1980s during the Soviet-Afghan War. As is well known, the United States and Pakistan, among others, cooperated closely to support the Afghan mujaheddin in their war against the Soviet Union. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the imposition of sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear-weapons development, ties cooled again.
A similar arrangement recommenced after 2001. Pakistan has cooperated with the United States against al-Qaeda and other militant groups, principally through its law enforcement forces and Directorate C of the ISI, its counter-terrorism branch. Pakistan reportedly shares selected bits of intelligence it gleans about al-Qaeda with American military forces and intelligence agencies, and it likely has given private consent to the U.S. drone campaign, possibly including use of air strips inside Pakistan for drone operations. Pakistan, in turn, is one of the largest recipients of U.S. military and economic assistance in the world–assistance which has totaled more than $8.3 billion since 2001.
The U.S. government has more leverage to compel Pakistan to stop supporting militants than is widely appreciated, and should not hesitate to use it.
But that is not the full story. For 60 years Pakistan has defined its national interest as the ability to compete with India, retain its hold on part of Kashmir, and advance its standing in the Muslim world. To these ends it fought four wars with India, sought hegemony over Afghanistan as “strategic depth,” developed nuclear weapons, and supported a range of militants as proxies against Afghanistan and India. It is increasingly clear, too, that, despite U.S. pressure, Pakistan has not played a helpful role in the war in Afghanistan. Elements within Pakistan continue to support militant and terrorist groups there such as the Haqqani Network. As if the situation were unclear, Pakistani National Security Advisor Sartaj Aziz publicly said in November 2014 that Pakistan should not target militants who do not attack Pakistan. “Why should America’s enemies become our enemies? When the United States attacked Afghanistan, all those that were trained and armed were pushed towards us. Some of them were dangerous for us and some are not. Why must we make enemies out of them all?”
At heart, what U.S. policy toward Pakistan should be depends on whether Pakistan is genuinely interested in cooperating with the United States but is held back by incapacity and weakness, or whether Pakistan is willfully deceptive, only pretending to cooperate to the minimum extent necessary to keep U.S. aid money flowing. If Pakistan’s problem is capacity, the U.S. government should give more aid. If Pakistan’s problem is one of calculated will, the U.S. government should stop giving aid and start imposing sanctions.
Paradoxically, both explanations are true; there is no single Pakistani policy. The government is schizophrenic, divided between illiberal civilian oligarchs, some of whom genuinely desire to stop Pakistan’s support for militants and develop closer ties with the United States, and military officers—who retain far more influence over Pakistan’s foreign and defense policy than is usual for an electoral democracy—some of whom have continued supporting selected jihadi groups. The Pakistani military continues to believe that India is Pakistan’s greatest enemy, that Afghanistan is Pakistan’s defense-in-depth, and that supporting jihadi proxies against India and Afghanistan is a legitimate strategy.
How can any U.S. Administration have a coherent policy toward an incoherent government? Probably the least bad approach would be to increase both carrots and sticks simultaneously to strengthen the parts of government that favor ties with the United States while weakening the parts that favor supporting militants. The main carrot the U.S. government can offer is economic and governance assistance. Since 2001, the United States provided $7.4 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan, in large part under the Kerry-Lugar bill of 2009. Continued investment in the infrastructure of civilian governance and civil society would help strengthen and entrench Pakistan’s transition to democracy. Because of the massive strategic implications of the success or failure of democracy in Pakistan, civilian aid to Pakistan—especially aid directed to organizations that foster accountability within government, like independent media, secular schools and universities, the judiciary, and public prosecutors—should be the top priority.
At the same time, the U.S. government has more leverage to compel Pakistan to stop supporting militants than is widely appreciated, and it should not hesitate to use it. There are at least four options: rescind Pakistan’s status as a Major Non-NATO Ally; end intelligence cooperation; designate individuals, organizations, or the Pakistani states sponsor of terrorism; and initiate or expand unilateral U.S. operations in Pakistan.
How much cooperation could such steps, either singly or together, produce? To answer that question, the next Administration needs to be clear about fundamental local strategic and political realities. Aside from its fixation on India, Pakistani military and intelligence elites believe that Pashtun nationalism remains a threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity. There are more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, but they make up a small percentage of the Pakistani population while they constitute a dominant plurality in Afghanistan. To reduce the threat of irredentism emanating from Kabul into Pakistani territory, Pakistani governments have long sponsored a broadening—but, alas, also radicalizing—Islamic identity in Afghan politics. This explains Pakistan’s sponsorship of the Taliban and why no Pakistani government, whether proto-democratic or military, has ever been willing to sever ties with potentially useful agents and groups across the border, no matter how radical or murderous. To the extent that Pakistan has failed to behave as a predictably useful ally in the war against the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqani Network, this is the basic reason for it.
So long as Pakistan prioritizes the Taliban over the United States, U.S. government has little reason to treat it as an ally.
Pakistan’s approach has gotten out of hand in recent years, giving rise to a level of armed radicalism within Pakistan that has taken a huge toll. Before the blowback hit, it was hard to see how any U.S. policy could change Islamabad’s calculations, given the depth of its interest in self-preservation. Now Pakistani calculations have been somewhat destabilized, potentially expanding U.S. leverage.
Thus, if the next Administration chooses the first option and formally dissolves the U.S.-Pakistan alliance, rescinding its Major Non-NATO Ally status, it is not a forgone conclusion that Pakistan’s level of counterterrorism cooperation with the United States would change much. Pakistan’s cooperation against al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban is in its own interest now that both groups have repeatedly targeted the Pakistani state. So long as Pakistan prioritizes the Taliban over the United States, however, the U.S. government has little reason to treat it as an ally.
As for the longstanding bilateral intelligence cooperation arrangement, Pakistan benefits much from this relationship. The U.S. government gives Pakistan a substantial amount of military assistance in the form of money, equipment, and training, some of which probably extends to or includes intelligence activities. The relationship has enabled U.S. forces to directly targeted Pakistan’s enemies in the course of its drone campaign. Reducing or eliminating intelligence cooperation with Pakistan would harm U.S. intelligence operations in the region as well as Pakistan’s, but none of the losses would be irreplaceable. Alternative basing for key facilities and sharing intelligence exists. Afghanistan, for example, would be just as good a location for basing assets to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of militant networks in South Asia, and a superior one for basing assets oriented toward Russia and Iran.
Besides, Pakistani intelligence sharing has been decidedly selective, and refocusing U.S. counterterrorism operations exclusively on groups that target the United States, rather than those who are fighting Pakistan, may constitute a more economical use of resources. Helping Pakistan fight the Pakistani Taliban might be good diplomacy, but it has not helped to win the war against the Afghan Taliban—and it might have had the unintended consequence of breeding complacency in the Pakistani Army about the strength and resilience of the country's homegrown militants.
The next Administration could also designate Pakistan, or specific Pakistani actors, as sponsors of terrorism. The Secretary of Treasury could designate individual Pakistanis as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) for complicity in terrorism or drug trafficking. Additionally, the next Secretary of State could designate Directorate S of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Directorate S of the ISI, in charge of external operations, plays a similar role as the IRGC-Quds Force plays in the Iranian government. If the Haqqani Network is a “veritable arm of the ISI,” as former JCS Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen claimed, Directorate S is the shoulder. An FTO designation would make it a Federal crime to provide material support to the group, bar members from entering or staying in the United States, and obligate U.S. financial institutions to freeze any of the group’s funds it holds. Taking such a step would end any remaining U.S. ties with Pakistani intelligence.
Designating Directorate S of the ISI as an FTO would only be possible if the U.S. government could show that it was a rogue organization outside the control of the Pakistani state. That may or may not be a plausible position to take, but its truth is less relevant than its political implications. U.S. policymakers may feel compelled to argue (or pretend) that Directorate S is rogue because if it is not, the necessary and logical next step is to designate Pakistan itself a state sponsor of terrorism. This final tier of terrorist designation would end all forms of U.S. assistance to Pakistan and trigger a wide range of sanctions and export controls. Pakistan would become a hostile power.
Finally, as a last resort, the U.S. government could initiate unilateral operations in Pakistan, including drone strikes and Special Forces raids, and including operations in Quetta. If the drone program is, as President Obama claimed in 2012, a useful means of launching pinpoint strikes against America’s enemies while minimizing the violation of another country’s sovereignty, then the next Administration could expand the program. Specifically, the U.S. government might expand the geographic range of drone strikes outside the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The Afghan Taliban senior leadership is widely believed to be in Quetta, in Baluchistan Province, beyond current U.S. counterterrorism operations capabilities. Those capabilities could be expanded or moved.
The United States must prevent any jihadi group from seizing power anywhere in the world. That is why the U.S. government should reverse course and redeploy troops to Afghanistan, consistent with the 2012 Strategic Partnership Agreement, for the next decade or longer.
A critic may answer that maintaining friendly ties with Islamabad is more important than defeating jihadist groups. Cracking down on Pakistan for the sake of defeating the Afghan Taliban may win the battle of Kabul but lose the war for South Asia by driving Pakistan into open hostility. According to this view, Pakistan is vastly more important than Afghanistan by dint of its sheer size, nuclear weapons, role in the Muslim world, and much bigger and more viable economy. The next Administration, according to this view, should continue to engage Pakistan, give it more economic assistance, and encourage the growth of civilian rule—essentially the Obama Administration’s strategy. If the United States has to take a loss in Afghanistan to preserve good ties with Pakistan, that is an acceptable price to pay.
The obvious rejoinder is: What good ties are left to preserve? During the war in Afghanistan, the United States received few irreplaceable benefits for its aid and alliance with Pakistan. Pakistan is indeed more important and powerful than Afghanistan, but that means we need a coherent, credible policy toward it, not a policy based on the principle that the U.S. government should never offend it. Russia is also a powerful state, but that does not mean the United States is obliged to pretend it is an ally or offer it billions of dollars in aid. The United States has paid a steep cost for its strategy toward Pakistan during both the Bush and Obama Administrations. Terrorists planning attacks against the United States and its allies operate in Pakistan almost unbothered by the Pakistani government. Pakistan’s rivalry with India could trigger nuclear war with global radiological fallout, as it nearly did in the winter of 2002-03. Pretending that Pakistan is an ally and giving it money has prevented none of these developments.
Besides, what price would the United States pay for such a policy reorientation? The list of possible reprisals—sponsorship of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unhelpful meddling in Afghanistan, threats to India—describes the recent history of Pakistani foreign policy as it already is. China might gain an opportunity to further deepen its relations with Pakistan, but the Chinese government seems unlikely to welcome closer ties to Islamabad than are necessary. Why would the Chinese government allow itself to be chain-ganged into a nuclear war with India instigated by irresponsible Pakistani behavior?
Moreover, the outcome of the conflict in Afghanistan is not immaterial to U.S.-Pakistani relations; the United States cannot simply walk away from Kabul as a gesture of goodwill to Islamabad. Losing in Afghanistan would hurt U.S. interests in Pakistan, not help: Losing there would mean civil war and a possible Taliban victory in Kabul, which in turn would empower Pakistani militants, give them a safe haven, and put more pressure on Islamabad to co-opt or appease them. Winning in Afghanistan, by contrast, would put further pressure on militants in Pakistan and demonstrate the U.S. commitment to building lasting stability in South Asia. Pakistan may be the horse drawing the Afghan cart, but one does not spend time grooming the horse if the cart is on fire.
Future American policymakers need not and should not initiate every one of these four policy options simultaneously, and hopefully they will not need to impose most of them. Rather, the next Administration should start by recognizing that current U.S. policy toward Pakistan—free cash, a formal alliance, and a blind eye turned toward Islamabad’s failings and betrayals—has failed to secure vital American interests in the region. At the least, U.S. policymakers need to start war-gaming alternatives to the U.S.-Pakistan relationship with a mind to cultivating and strengthening ties with other states in the region.
The United States must prevent any jihadi group from seizing power anywhere in the world. That is why the U.S. government should reverse course and redeploy troops to Afghanistan, consistent with the 2012 Strategic Partnership Agreement, for the next decade or longer. Afghanistan is vital to American national security because it provides a platform from which to directly target al-Qaeda and other militant groups in South Asia. It is vital to prevent the Taliban from retaking power. A Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will almost certainly become safe haven once again for al-Qaeda or other militant groups. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their many affiliates and allies in the region have not been defeated and, as illustrated by recent developments in Iraq, are likely to grow stronger in a power vacuum created by a full U.S. withdrawal.
Additionally, success or failure in Afghanistan will affect America’s interests across South Asia: Pakistan’s stability and the security of its nuclear weapons, NATO’s credibility, relations with Iran and Russia, transnational drug-trafficking networks, worldwide democracy promotion, and humanitarian considerations. These real and enduring interests require a substantial and lasting commitment to the region, and they explain why the mission in Afghanistan is not simply about denying safe haven to al-Qaeda but fostering long-lasting stability in South Asia.
If U.S. forces withdraw completely, as they are now scheduled to do by the end of 2016, Afghan forces are likely to show themselves as unprepared as their Iraqi counterparts to face a renewed insurgent offensive alone.
Iraq could hardly be a clearer cautionary tale: If the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan before Afghan security forces are able to lead the fight against the Taliban and deny safe haven to al-Qaeda, militants are almost certain to regain some degree of safe haven there, much as the Islamic State gained ground since the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011—especially since the withdrawal of U.S. troops could mean the end of the reported program in South Asia. Certain key parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan are striking. In Afghanistan, the insurgency gained ground from 2006 to 2009 and threatened to balloon into full-scale civil war, as in Iraq in 2006-07. A surge of U.S. troops in 2010-11 halted the insurgents momentum and, albeit less dramatically than in Iraq, began to reverse their gains. U.S. policymakers took advantage of their success to plan for transition to indigenous leadership.
This time, however, the agreements for a stay-behind force of U.S. troops—a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2012 and accompanying Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) signed in 2014—were framed as a decade-long arrangement, in contrast to the three-year duration of the abandoned Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement. The longer time frame made sense. Afghan security forces in 2014 did not have the logistics, air support, intelligence, and transportation capabilities they needed to succeed. The pieces seemed to be in place for an enduring U.S. presence and partnership with local security forces.
President Obama’s announcement of a complete pullout by the end of 2016 changed the outlook for Afghanistan dramatically, making it more likely that something like a replay of events in Iraq will take place. If U.S. forces withdraw completely, as they are now scheduled to do by the end of 2016, Afghan forces are likely to show themselves to be as unprepared as their Iraqi counterparts to face a renewed insurgent offensive alone. While they are unlikely to collapse immediately, they may withdraw from some districts and provinces in the south and east to minimize casualties and focus on securing major cities and roadways. Such redeployments would make military sense, but they would also amount to a de facto ceasefire with local Taliban forces and enable the Taliban (and thus al-Qaeda) to control some Afghan territory—as the Islamic State now does in Iraq and Syria.
The Taliban would then gain further strength and momentum through their control of the drug trade, as the Islamic State benefits from the oil industry. Their operational freedom would be further strengthened if the alleged U.S. drone program in South Asia—which requires at least some personnel on the ground for airfield security, logistics, and maintenance—ended. Militants’ control of territory would lend them an air of legitimacy and strength with locals and even win some degree of support, whether through loyalty or fear—again, just as in Iraq and Syria. Finally, if political wrangling in the capital convinces Afghans that their government cannot meet their needs or protect them, as Sunnis seem to have concluded about Baghdad, they are likely to be more receptive to local solutions, even if they come with the Taliban’s imprimatur.
The Obama Administration was compelled to re-engage with Iraq three years after it left. There are high costs associated with the withdrawal and reintroduction of U.S. forces abroad. The U.S. government can save those gratuitous costs in Afghanistan by retaining a robust stay-behind force to train Afghan security forces, conduct counterterrorism raids, and support the Afghan forces’ rural counterinsurgency efforts. If U.S. efforts also succeed in improving Afghan governance and democracy, it would foster an example of democracy in the Muslim world and craft a long-term partnership with a democratic state that borders both Iran and Pakistan. That scenario will be difficult to achieve, to be sure, but it is not impossible.
The essential condition for victory is, and has always been, the construction of a state capable of governing Afghanistan. This is the simple requirement of counter-insurgency, the primary objective of which is to “foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government,” according to the U.S. Army counter-insurgency manual. Counter-insurgency is competitive state-building: Kabul must out-govern the Taliban to demonstrate to the population why it deserves support. Only when the international community can be confident that an effective government will enforce its writ throughout Afghanistan can it safely withdraw the props of support it has provided Kabul.
General David Petraeus told Congress in March 2011, when he was Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, that “I am concerned that funding for our State Department and USAID partners will not sufficiently enable them to build on the hard-fought security achievements of our men and women in uniform. Inadequate resourcing of our civilian partners could, in fact, jeopardize accomplishment of the overall mission.” Petraeus’ remarkable statement—that the United States could lose the war in Afghanistan without greater funding for civilian reconstruction and governance assistance—fell on deaf ears. Under the Obama Administration, U.S. aid for governance and development declined by almost $1.5 billion—one-third of the total—from 2010 to 2011, and it has continued to decline every year since.  This is especially worrisome considering that the World Bank and Afghan Central Bank recently judged that Afghanistan will require $4 billion in assistance per year for ongoing reconstruction efforts.
The next Administration can reverse this decline in a revenue-neutral manner: The withdrawal of tens of thousands of U.S. combat forces has generated more than enough cost savings to pay for increased civilian aid. Even sending more U.S. troops back to Afghanistan will still leave the U.S. presence there far smaller and more affordable than it was at its peak in 2010-11. A surge of foreign aid to Afghanistan would not appreciably increase the financial burden on the U.S. Treasury, but it could change the trajectory of Afghan governance and mean the difference between U.S. policy success and failure.
 This essay is adapted from chapter seven of American Power and Liberal Order: Grand Strategy in the 21st Century (Georgetown University Press, 2016) and is used with the permission of the publisher.
 Several recent books tell the tale well: Stephen P. Cohen’s The Idea of Pakistan; Daniel Markey’s No Exit From Pakistan; Bruce Riedel’s Deadly Embrace; and John R. Schmidt’s The Unraveling.
 “Militants not dangerous to Pakistan should not be targeted: Sartaj,” Dawn, November 18, 2014.
 Congressional Research Service, “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-2016.”
 Steven Coll in Ghost Wars and Ahmed Rashid in Descent into Chaos both document these and other charges in detail.
 David Petraeus, "Statement of General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army Commander, International Security Assistance Forces NATO, Before Senate Armed Services Committee," Testimony for the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, March 15, 2011.
 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report (July 30, 2015): 79.
 Stephane Guimbert, "Afghanistan--Aid Effectiveness, Fiscal Outlook Need Further Attention," Discussion at World Bank Live, Washington, DC, January 31, 2006.